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RESCUING REVERSE ENGINEERING*
Barak D. Jolisht
I. INTRODUCTION
A good scientist is a person with original ideas. A good engineer
is a person who makes a design that works with as few original
ideas as possible. There are no prima donnas in engineering.'
Reverse engineering is the art of the follower, the free-rider, the
copycat, and, sometimes, the thief. In reverse engineering one disas-
sembles another person's product to learn how it works and to ap-
propriate its ideas. It is a shortcut around the countless hours and
substantial costs of product development and testing otherwise re-
quired to achieve a market-ready good. Yet, reverse engineering is
also an accelerator of progress, allowing competitors to produce
compatible goods or improve upon existing designs. This interaction
rewards the public with a constant barrage of newer, better and
cheaper products.
In weighing these considerations, the Supreme Court has his-
torically regarded reverse engineering as a positive force that is inte-
gral to U.S. intellectual property law and policy. In recent years,
however, the courts have struggled with cases involving the reverse
engineering of software, for two reasons: (1) such engineering neces-
sarily requires the production of an intermediate copy of the program,
a prima facie copyright violation and (2) software producers often
impose license-based prohibitions on reverse engineering. Though
the courts have yet to definitively resolve these issues, it appears
from cases like Sega v. Accolade2 and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg3
that software manufacturers may well be able to prevent the reverse
engineering of their products. Such a result would undermine tradi-
* Copyright © 1998 Barak D. Jolish.
t All errors and omissions remain those of the author.
1. Freeman Dyson, physicist and author, in DISTuRBING THE UNIVERSE § 1 (1979).
2. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
3. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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tional copyright and patent law, and harm the market and the public
interest. It can and should be avoided by an act of Congress, the Su-
preme Court or the Executive Branch.
II. TiH REVERSE ENGI NEERING OF SOFTWARE
Software is big business - in 1996 U.S. personal computer ap-
plication sales alone exceeded $10 billion.4 In this fast-moving and
competitive market, software developers often use reverse engineer-
ing to study their rivals' products.5 These developers then use this
information to create compatible products, or to develop their own
software.6 Many in the industry disagree, of course, as to whether the
practice of reverse engineering is a positive phenomenon or instead a
form of piracy that discourages research and innovation. Ultimately,
however, most software publishers have tried to use legal obstacles to
prevent the reverse engineering of their products; for example,
claiming copyright and license protections.
A. The Sega Case and Copyright Law
The first case to directly address the collision of reverse engi-
neering and copyright law was Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc.7 Plaintiff, Sega, manufactured and marketed a popular video
game console and proprietary game software. Embedded in each
game's object code was a "lock and key" device which caused the
console to recognize and play only Sega cartridges. Defendant Ac-
colade purchased several publicly available Sega cartridges, and re-
verse engineered their code in order to find the "key." Accolade then
employed this key in its own game cartridges for the Sega console.
Sega sued, alleging that Accolade's intermediate copying constituted
copyright infringement. The Ninth Circuit held that, though interme-
4. See Software Publisher Association Press Release, 1996 Personal Computer Appli-
cation Software Sales Pass $10 Billion for the First Time (visited February 8, 1998)
<http:lwww.spa.orglresearchlreleases/1996NA.htm> (representing a 8.3% rise over the 1995
total). (The content located at this URL is available at the JOURNAL office).
5. See Robert R. Lech, Protecting Computer Software Against Reverse Engineering, 73
MICH. Bus. L.J. 526, 527 (1994).
6. The use of reverse engineering does not protect a developer from an action for copy-
right or patent infringement in his or her end product. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY §1.18[3] (2d. ed. 1996). This essay will not, therefore, deal with
questions of substantial similarity and infringement in products which competitors produced
after reverse engineering.
7. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
RESCUNG REVERSE ENGiNEER1G
diate copying could infringe a software copyright, Accolade's actions
constituted a protected fair use.
The Sega case analysis, as to market effect, is subtle. The court
ruled that since Accolade's copying was intended to discover the
code required for compatibility with Sega consoles, the relevant area
of competition for statutory analysis was only the "lock and key"
mechanism. The court explained, "it is the characteristics of the
game program as experienced by the user that determine the pro-
gram's commercial success [and] there is nothing in the record to
suggest that Accolade copied any of those elements." 8 This analysis
raises the most serious questions as to the scope of the fair use ex-
ception pronounced in the case. If Accolade had reverse engineered
to learn how Sega games achieve their pacing, the court might well
have ruled that the relevant area of competition was "the game pro-
gram as experienced by the user." Thus, Accolade's reverse engi-
neering would be aimed at a factor in which it competes with Sega.
Would the court see public benefit in allowing others to emulate the
stylistic elements of Sega's games?
The court does, however, finally note that underlying its entire
analysis are the public policy goals of copyright law. The law strives
to achieve a balance "between the benefit the public will derive if the
use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will re-
ceive if the use is denied... [t]he less adverse effect that an alleged
infringing use has on the copyright owner's expectation of gain, the
less public benefit need be shown." 9 Following this logic, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that in attempting to monopolize the game car-
tridge market, Sega was itself undermining the "statutory purpose of
promoting expression." 10
III. IMPACTS OF PROHIBITIONs ON REVERSE ENGINEERING OF SOFTWARE
Restrictions on reverse engineering extend the scope of trade
secret protection beyond its traditional bounds. No longer a tool to
protect closely held, well guarded secrets, the doctrine today applies
to literally millions of software programs circulating freely around
the world. Copyright, a doctrine meant to protect only expression, is
similarly stretched to cover the ideas in program code. This hybrid
of protection threatens the carefully crafted balance which the
8. Id. at 1523.
9. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (internal citations omitted).
10. Segav. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1523-24.
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authors of federal copyright, patent and trade secret protection
worked to forge.
A. Harm to the Market
Prohibitions on reverse engineering would harm the market by
raising the cost of products and reducing the number of choices
available to consumers. In examining this question "a Chicago
school economist might suggest that the original creator will
grant... a license [to reverse engineer] to the competitor if and only
if the value of the new use exceeds the cost, and therefore that a fail-
ure to license is conclusive evidence that the competitor's proposed
use would be inefficient."" This approach is inaccurate for two rea-
sons. First, countless non-economic factors play a role in the deci-
sion to license a product. Secondly, this approach fails to account for
the externalities of an enhanced consumer surplus scenario.'2
Ultimately, prohibiting reverse engineering would stifle the
proliferation of ideas, bounty of products, and hearty competition -
all of which are the very reasons courts have supported the practice
of reverse engineering.
IV. STEPS TO RESOLVING SoFTWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING OBSTACLES
A. Legislation
The simplest way to eliminate the confusion regarding reverse
engineering would be to pass legislation granting it specific protec-
tion. In fact, Congress included just such, sua sponte, via an explicit
reverse engineering defense in Section 906(a) of the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984.' Alternatively, as some have sug-
gested, Congress could codify reverse engineering as a fair use ex-
ception.' 4 Congress should explicitly assert that reverse engineering
11. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REv. 989, 1057-58 (1997).
12. Id.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1994). The Act expressly permits copying a protected maskwork
for the purposes of teaching, analysis, or evaluation.
14. See Allan M. Soobert, Legitimizing Decompilation of Computer SoJhvare Under
Copyright Laiv: A Square Peg in Search of a Square Hole, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 105-107
(1994) (proposing statutory exception to copyright law that permits limited reverse engineering
of computer software). Congress, however, seems reluctant to make such a modification to the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101-1101 (1994), even though it is aware of the uncertainty sur-
rounding reverse engineering. The legislative history of 1992 amendments to criminal copy-
right penalties under the Copyright Act states that "[t]his legislation should not be construed
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is a right that cannot be preempted by contract or state law in general,
and thus eliminate the existing state of confusion through legislative
action.
B. Judicial Action
In addition, courts could use fair use principles to disallow re-
verse engineering restrictions. Since the public interest is a factor
that continually informs this area of the law, it would be well within
the Supreme Court's discretion to uphold a wide interpretation of
Sega, thereby extending a more robust protection to the reverse engi-
neering of software.
C. Regulatoiy Action
Furthermore, the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of In-
tellectual Property of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission strive to "promote innovation and consumer wel-
fare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition with
respect to either existing or new ways of serving consumers." 15 As
the Sega court noted, if reverse engineering was automatically
branded an unfair use, the copyright owner would hold a virtual mo-
nopoly on the functional aspects of a work.16 Thus, restrictions on re-
verse engineering should raise the ire of government regulators, es-
pecially when the software in question already holds a large share of
the market.
V. CONCLUSION
The reverse engineering of software is essentially similar in
purpose to the reverse engineering of toasters, tanks or boats. It is,
therefore, unreasonable to apply to software an entirely different set
of rules with regard to the practice - especially if these rules under-
mine the purpose and function of traditional copyright and patent
law.
by the courts as expressing Congressional intent on the question of whether reverse engineer-
ing is or is not a civil violation of copyright law." H.R. REP. No. 997, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
n.15 (1992).
15. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMIssION, ANITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995).
16. Segav. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522.
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